The EU's "Sanctions Paradox" by PORTELA, Clara,
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
10-2007
The EU's "Sanctions Paradox"
PORTELA, Clara
Singapore Management University, claraportela@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research_all
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Social Influence and Political Communication
Commons
This Magazine Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
PORTELA, Clara. The EU's "Sanctions Paradox". (2007). SWP Comments. 1-8. Research Collection School of Social Sciences.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research_all/13
  Clara Portela is a researcher at European University Institute, in Florence (Italy), SWP Comments 18 
 she was a visiting fellow at SWP in summer 2007 October 2007 
1 
SW
P 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute 
for International and 
Security Affairs 
Introduction 
 
The EU’s “Sanctions Paradox” 
Clara Portela 
The forthcoming Summit meeting between the European Union (EU) and Africa next 
December will be the first event of this kind in the past seven years. However, the row 
over the participation of Zimbabwe’s President, Robert Mugabe, is casting a shadow 
over the upcoming event: A number of African states have threatened to boycott the 
meeting if Zimbabwe’s leader is not invited, while the British government has indi-
cated that it will not attend the meeting if he does. At the root of this row is an “EU 
sanction”: a visa ban prohibiting the entry into EU territory to Zimbabwean high-rank 
officials. Zimbabwe has been under EU sanctions since the crisis of 2002. The visa ban 
and the arms embargo imposed then were supplemented shortly after by an assets 
freeze; however, no restrictions on trade between the EU and Zimbabwe have been 
imposed. European aid continues to flow to the country. So what do “EU sanctions” 
consist of? What kind of measures are they, and why is it that they forbid the issue of 
visas to foreign leaders but leave trade untouched? What do we know about the harm 
they cause to their targets? Ought current EU practices be improved upon? 
 
EU “Targeted” Sanctions: 
An Unknown CFSP Tool 
EU sanctions are not a new phenomenon. 
The EU has been imposing “autonomous” 
sanctions in the absence of a United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate 
since the early 1980s. Still, little was known 
about EU sanctions policy until the publi-
cation of a series of documents from 2003 
onwards. Until then, the term “sanctions” 
was not even used in EU institutions: 
Embargoes and bans were referred to as 
restrictive measures, or mesures négatives. 
The EU Strategy against the Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
which was adopted in parallel to the Euro-
pean Security Strategy, first mentioned the 
potential use of sanctions when political 
and diplomatic measures failed. The June 
2004 “Basic Principles on the Use of Restric-
tive Measures (Sanctions)” distinguishes 
two strands of EU sanctions practice. While 
it stresses its commitment to implement 
sanctions decided by the UNSC, the EU 
announces that “if necessary” it will also 
impose sanctions in the absence of a UN 
mandate, “in accordance with its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in 
conformity with international law.” The 
EU will consider wielding autonomous 
sanctions in support of the fight against 
terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and 
the protection of human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law. Yet, the two-page “Basic 
Principles” contains only minimal infor-
mation on the types of “targeted” measures 
used by the EU.  
Current EU sanctions mostly lack an 
economic character, and have little to do 
with the traditional idea of economic 
sanctions à la Iraq. In the “Basic Principles,” 
the EU subscribes to sanctions geared to 
achieving maximum impact on those 
whose behaviour it wants to influence, 
while minimising “humanitarian effects 
or adverse consequences for persons not 
targeted or neighbouring countries.” 
This feature is not unique to EU sanctions: 
general trade embargoes have been 
replaced by targeted or ‘smart’ sanctions 
also in the practice of the UN and other 
international actors. The unpopularity 
provoked by the acute humanitarian 
consequences of trade embargoes, such as 
that imposed by the UN on Iraq brought 
about a preference for the use of targeted 
measures. Smart sanctions encompass 
measures that fall short of general em-
bargoes: visa bans and assets freezes, flight 
bans, diplomatic sanctions, financial 
sanctions such as investment bans and 
embargoes on selected commodities (most 
commonly arms, but also oil, timber or 
diamonds). Many of them are not new; they 
used to be wielded in addition to general 
embargoes in the past. What is new is the 
idea that they can work by targeting only 
the responsible individuals. Since smart 
sanctions have been in operation for less 
than fifteen years, their use is still at an 
experimental stage. However, it has already 
become clear that some of these measures 
can have humanitarian consequences. In a 
notorious example, the UNSC refrained 
from imposing a planned flight ban against 
Sudan in 1996 due to the expected impact 
on humanitarian deliveries.  
EU Sanctions: 
Catalogue and “mode d’emploi” 
The EU Treaty empowers the Council to 
impose sanctions against third countries 
within the framework of the CFSP. These 
are agreed by unanimity through legally 
binding Common Positions. After the Com-
mon Position has been adopted, sanctions 
which do not affect EC competence, such 
as visa bans and arms embargoes, are im-
plemented directly by the Member States. 
Sanctions which impinge upon EC com-
petence, such as financial sanctions, neces-
sitate the adoption of additional EC legis-
lation: This has come to be known as the 
“two-steps” procedure. Before the creation 
of the CFSP, sanctions were announced in 
Presidency statements. Sanctions regimes 
adopted at the time were gradually formal-
ised into Common Positions once this 
instrument was available—with the notable 
exception of the arms embargo against 
China, which remained in its original form. 
Sanctions regimes have come to incorpo-
rate a one-year “expiry date,” so that the 
Council decides anew on the extension of 
sanctions yearly. Since 2004, the Council 
formation RELEX/Sanctions has been in 
charge of drafting the Common Positions 
and monitoring their implementation.  
Diplomatic sanctions 
Routinely, the limitation of contacts is the 
first sanction that the EU adopts in order 
to signal disapproval. This is a traditional 
diplomatic sanction consisting in the inter-
ruption of high-level meetings and visits: 
Bilateral contacts continue to take place, 
but they are held less frequently and 
between officials at a lower level. Belarus 
serves as a current example: EU-Belarus 
meetings take place at the so-called level 
of directors or experts, that is, officials 
below the ministerial rank, while political 
postings are excluded from direct contact 
with the EU. Diplomatic sanctions can also 
consist in the downsizing of the personnel 
in the representations of the Member States 
accredited to the target country. EU Mem-
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ber States with embassies in Burma recalled 
their military attachés in 1991, while they 
expelled the Burmese military attachés of 
their representations in the EU. The tra-
ditional pallet of diplomatic sanctions 
also features the recall of ambassadors and 
the complete interruption of diplomatic 
relations. However, the EU refrains from 
employing such wide-ranging measures: 
A minimum of diplomatic relations is 
always maintained. Diplomatic sanctions 
are often adopted as part of larger sanctions 
packages. In the aftermath of the Tianan-
men events of 1989, the EU imposed an 
arms embargo and agreed the “reduction 
of programmes of cultural, scientific, and 
technical co-operation” with China.  
Visa bans 
Visa bans have become—together with arms 
embargoes—the most frequently issued 
CFSP sanctions. They constitute one of the 
initial steps in the EU’s sanctions sequence. 
Visa bans are currently in force against 
Burmese, Zimbabwean, Belarusian, Uzbek 
and Transnistrian leaders and high-ranking 
officials: Blacklisted individuals are not 
allowed to participate in Summit meetings 
with regional groupings. The effects of visa 
bans are comparable to those of diplomatic 
sanctions—however, the visa ban is a 
stronger measure in so far as it not only 
prevents the blacklisted persons from 
attending official meetings, but also from 
travelling to the EU for private purposes, 
such as holidays, education, shopping or 
visiting relatives. At the same time, visa 
bans represent the only CFSP sanction that 
the EU can wield against members of non-
state entities, such as alleged members of 
terrorist organisations, or the Transnistrian 
leadership.  
Member States’ adherence to EU visa 
bans has not been optimal. President 
Mugabe was refused boarding into a trans-
fer flight in a British airport and was sent 
back to Zimbabwe. Yet, France allowed him 
to attend the Franco-African Summit in 
Paris in 2003, and Italy granted him per-
mission to travel to the Vatican for the 
Pope’s funeral in 2005. While these devi-
ations undermine the ban politically, they 
are formally legal: The Common Positions 
provide for the granting of exceptions 
when Member States are “bound by obli-
gations as hosts” to international organi-
sations and UN conferences, or under 
agreements conferring privileges and 
immunities. Exemptions from the ban are 
permitted on the grounds of humanitarian 
need. Blacklisted individuals might be 
allowed into the EU to attend meetings 
geared towards promoting human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law. A Member 
State wishing to grant a visa to a blacklisted 
person on these grounds has to notify its 
intention to the Council. If objections are 
raised, the Council might still decide to 
grant the proposed exception by qualified 
majority. In the absence of objections 
within 48 hours, the visa is deemed to be 
granted.  
Freezing of assets 
As with visa bans, assets freezes are im-
posed through a CFSP Common Position 
with a blacklist annexed. The freezing of 
assets often constitutes the second stage 
in the EU gradualist strategy: Following 
flawed elections in Belarus in 2001, the EU 
wielded a visa ban against the leadership, 
which was expanded to an assets freeze in 
reaction to the again fraudulent elections 
of 2006. A freeze affects funds and eco-
nomic resources “owned, held or con-
trolled” by the listed individuals, and it is 
accompanied by a prohibition to make 
funds available to them “directly or in-
directly.” Again, the Common Positions 
foresee exceptions: Funds may be released 
when intended for basic needs or for the 
payment of professional fees, and a more 
general clause providing for extraordinary 
exemptions also exists. A Member State 
wishing to grant an exemption is obliged 
to inform the Commission and the other 
Member States two weeks in advance. Con-
trary to the visa ban, no procedure for 
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objections exists. Since this measure con-
cerns Community competences, banks are 
obliged to notify the Commission of the 
freezing of assets under the names of black-
listed individuals.  
Arms embargoes 
Embargoes on arms and military equip-
ment that can be used for internal repres-
sion are frequently wielded in situations 
involving violence. Common Positions 
imposing arms embargoes feature a list of 
items covered by the embargo, and are 
routinely accompanied by the suspension 
of military co-operation. Arms embargoes 
are sometimes imposed during armed 
conflicts between a government and rebel 
forces, and they are often superseded by 
identical UN measures in a matter of 
months. This was the case with the 1999 
EU embargoes against Eritrea and Ethiopia 
and the 1991 embargo against the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Most fre-
quently, though, the EU imposes arms 
embargoes in reaction to acts of internal 
repression, or one-sided violence by state 
forces against the civilian population. 
This pattern repeats itself in the EU arms 
embargo imposed against China following 
the Tiananmen events in 1989, Indonesia 
in 1999, Sudan in 1996, and Uzbekistan in 
2005. Virtually all regimes under CFSP 
sanctions have repressed violently civilian 
demonstrations. Due to their media reso-
nance, these events lend themselves to 
strong EU reactions, and they are often 
linked to the reluctance by autocratic 
regimes to give way to democratic reforms, 
for example, Burma, Zimbabwe, China and 
Belarus.  
Selective economic sanctions 
Selective economic and financial sanctions 
have been used only rarely by the EU: em-
bargoes on specific commodities (other 
than arms), flight bans, investment bans 
and a ban on payments. The EU imposed all 
four measures against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the Kosovo con-
flict as part of its most sophisticated sanc-
tions operation to date. The oil embargo, 
the flight ban and the ban on payments 
imposed against the FRY are unique EU 
autonomous measures: no prior or later use 
is known. The investment ban is the only 
measure that was applied once again: In 
2004, the EU prohibited European com-
panies and organisations from providing 
loans and equities to Burmese state-owned 
enterprises. The investment ban and the oil 
embargo against the FRY displayed some 
unique features, revealing a creative use of 
the sanctions tools. In spite of the EU oil 
embargo, the “Energy for Democracy” pro-
gramme created selective exemptions 
allowing for oil to be supplied to Montene-
gro, Kosovo and the districts under the 
control of the Serbian opposition. Similarly, 
the investment ban exempted those enter-
prises whose lack of links to the Milosevic 
regime could be proved. However, this 
inventive approach was never re-applied 
after the Kosovo episode was concluded.  
Non-CFSP EU sanctions 
The EU also wields sanctions outside the 
framework of the CFSP: They are adopted 
“informally” by the Council in Presidency 
Conclusions. The common denominator of 
these measures is that they are not labelled 
“sanctions.” However, such measures cor-
respond to the standard definition of 
sanctions. Indeed, before the creation of 
the CFSP, the Council routinely agreed 
sanctions in Presidency statements. The 
legal basis of the 1989 China arms em-
bargo, or the 1991 Burma sanctions, was 
merely a Presidency statement. The practice 
of imposing measures in the form of state-
ments has not been entirely replaced by the 
use of CFSP acts. In parallel to these, the EU 
continues to adopt sanctions “informally.” 
Member States preferred to react to the 
1998 India/Pakistani nuclear tests, and to 
Russian human rights violations in Chech-
nya in 1999 with the adoption of measures 
included in the Council Conclusions. The 
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type of measures also differ from those 
imposed under CFSP: They consisted in the 
deferral of the signing of co-operation 
agreements, or in the redirection of aid. 
More recent examples include the deferral 
of negotiations on an agreement with Iran 
pending the signature of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol, 
and the diplomatic sanctions against Cuba 
of 2003, which prescribed the invitation of 
dissidents to the national celebrations in 
EU embassies in Havana.  
The preference for informal measures 
often reflects the reluctance of Member 
States to antagonise major partners like 
Russia, or the existence of intra-EU disagree-
ments on policies towards the country in 
question, as with Cuba. This approach 
offers evident advantages: They are only 
political in nature. Since the duration or 
scope of the measures is left unspecified, 
they often “die a natural death.” Tech-
nical and scientific co-operation between 
China and Member States gradually 
resumed in the absence of any Council 
decision revoking the sanctions. The weak 
character of these sanctions has sometimes 
been mocked by observers: The 1999 sanc-
tions against Russia were labelled “pseudo-
sanctions,” while the measures concerning 
Cuba are referred to as “cocktail” sanctions. 
The withdrawal of trade preferences under 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
and the partial suspension of development 
aid can also be considered sanctions; how-
ever, they are adopted in more rigid legal 
frameworks.  
Effectiveness by Stigmatisation?  
Can this toolbox of limited measures, 
mostly lacking economic bite, have any 
impact on the individuals and situations 
it attempts to affect? EU sanctions do not 
deprive their targets of essentials. Travel 
bans can be circumvented with false pass-
ports. Names in Cyrillic-script can be 
transcribed into Latin-script in different 
forms. Blacklisted individuals interested in 
conducting business abroad can resort to 
intermediaries to travel to third countries. 
For the purposes of vacations, shopping, or 
education of their children, they can turn 
to other destinations. The same applies to 
the freezing of assets: Funds can be trans-
ferred easily to bank accounts outside 
Europe before the freeze comes into effect. 
Indeed, only small amounts have been 
frozen under the assets freezes. Generous 
provisions for the granting of exceptions 
avoid causing serious disutility to the 
targets. Arms embargoes imposed by a 
single entity are bound to remain irrele-
vant: They are issued late and on areas 
where arms abound, and targets always 
find alternative suppliers. They might have 
prevented some states like Uzbekistan or 
Burma from acquiring certain high-tech-
nology items, but their purchasing power 
would not allow them large-scale orders 
anyway. The deferral of the signing of 
treaties are short-term, easily revocable 
measures, while redirections of aid do not 
involve but a fraction of the funds foreseen 
for the recipients. Diplomatic sanctions are 
by their very nature regarded as merely 
symbolic gestures. Measures which entail 
economic components, such as selective 
embargoes or flight bans, might hold more 
promise of damaging the target, but given 
that these are hardly employed by the EU, it 
is difficult to ascertain their usefulness.  
In some instances, blacklisted individu-
als resent the disruptive effects of the sanc-
tions—the impact of the measures varies 
largely from case to case. The bans caused 
substantial discomfort to the cosmopolitan 
elites of rich African countries such as 
Zimbabwe or Nigeria, who were used to 
sending their children to British universi-
ties and to shopping in European capitals. 
By virtue of the EU’s geographic proximity, 
Belarusian officials are reportedly fearful 
of being included in an EU blacklist. Presi-
dent Lukashenko himself is known to have 
routinely spent his holidays in Austria prior 
to the imposition of the ban.  
The fact that EU sanctions are mainly 
“symbolic” does not mean that they lack 
impact. In fact, the few “successes” but also 
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the various “failures” of EU measures show 
that sanctions can have an effect by means 
of that very symbolism: EU sanctions have 
served as irritants in the relations between 
the EU and its targets. As EU officials put it, 
“some degree of discomfort in bilateral rela-
tions” was consistently maintained thanks 
to the presence of sanctions. The seemingly 
negligible “cocktail” sanctions triggered a 
major diplomatic crisis with Cuba. Even the 
intractable military junta of Burma is not 
totally insensitive to the international stig-
ma of being the subject of sanctions. China 
consistently complained that the persis-
tence of the EU arms embargo constituted 
a source of humiliation.  
The maintenance of a minimum of diplo-
matic relations entails various benefits. It 
has helped to canalise signs of discontent 
that could not have been communicated 
otherwise. At the same time, it has per-
mitted the conduct of activities of interest 
to the EU. Trade continues with all coun-
tries “under EU sanctions.” Some forms of 
co-operation exist with Belarus, notably in 
the energy field. Some development assis-
tance flows to Sudan and Burma, even if 
political relations remain constrained. 
With China, the persistence of an arms 
embargo has not hindered the flourishing 
of trade relations. 
Even when the affected leaderships pub-
licly claim indifference to EU measures, 
their reactions reveal a desire to recover 
some international recognition. Observers 
have noted that the Transnistrian leader-
ship reacted to international condemnation 
by mimicking the establishment of demo-
cratic institutions. Belarusian leaders 
attempted to avoid the suspension of GSP 
preferences by enacting legislation imitat-
ing—but falling short of—the International 
Labour Organisation standards protecting 
the freedom of trade unions. The Uzbek 
leadership, while initially reluctant to dis-
cuss the 2005 Andijon events, replaced the 
governor of the province in the aftermath 
of the imposition of EU sanctions. While 
these cosmetic changes ultimately failed to 
correct the flaws which triggered the sanc-
tions, the targeted leaderships implicitly 
acknowledged the legitimacy of EU aims. In 
this sense, EU actions appear to contribute 
to “shape conceptions of the normal,” as 
suggested in the normative power scholar-
ship. 
The desire to avert the stigma of being 
the object of sanctions is linked to the 
target’s aspiration to recognition and pres-
tige. China, which yearns to be regarded as 
a responsible power, has actively lobbied 
for the lifting of the EU embargo. The only 
target which has had a CFSP sanctions 
regime almost totally lifted is Uzbekistan, 
a country aspiring to become the regional 
leader in Central Asia. By contrast, the 
parochial leadership of Burma, which 
regards as its primary goal the defence of 
the state against numerous rebel groups, is 
least amenable to influence through inter-
national stigmatisation. In some countries 
where the leadership seems unyielding, 
the desire to recover international respect 
is also reflected in the fact that officials 
from circles close to the leaderships often 
approach the EU about the removal of the 
sanctions. These contacts normally take 
place in the diplomatic milieu and remain 
out of the public eye, but they show that 
sanctions do create discomfort. Yet, this 
sensitivity often fails to compel leaderships 
to change behaviour in the way desired by 
the EU. The absence of this automatism 
constitutes the main difficulty with the 
operation of sanctions—as was already the 
case with twentieth-century trade embar-
goes.  
The EU’s Sanctions Paradox  
While stigmatisation harms, it has rarely 
proved effective in extracting concessions 
from the targets. Why does the EU refrain 
from adopting more forceful measures? 
Given the economic weight enjoyed by the 
EU, it appears that those targeted measures 
at the economic end of the smart sanctions 
spectrum could prove more persuasive than 
the symbolic sanctions employed so far. 
Selective economic sanctions have been 
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wielded very rarely, and sometimes in 
situations in which they were bound to 
remain without impact: The investment 
ban against the FRY was deprived from any 
effects given that EU companies were 
hardly investing in the FRY at the time. 
Equally, hardly any investment takes place 
in Burma due to the prevailing volatile 
environment. It appears paradoxical that a 
major trading power renounces the use of 
economic tools to influence third countries. 
To borrow the term from the International 
Relations scholar Daniel Drezner, this can 
be labelled the “EU’s sanctions paradox.” 
A series of factors prevent the EU from 
imposing measures with some economic 
bite: First, the EU has an extreme humani-
tarian concern for sparing the population 
from suffering. This preoccupation, en-
shrined in the “Basic Principles,” is often 
reiterated in public declarations. In the 
aftermath of the 2006 flawed Belarus 
elections, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
claimed that “sanctions which harm the 
wider population” should be avoided, 
announcing that Commission assistance 
would not stop. This idea is consistent with 
practice: EU aid in direct support of the 
population and civil society continues to 
flow to countries under CFSP sanctions. 
Since the imposition of sanctions in 2002, 
the amount of EU aid provided to Zim-
babwe has actually increased—although it 
is no longer channelled through the gov-
ernment, and primarily consists of humani-
tarian assistance. EU “humanitarianism” 
extends even to the blacklisted persons: 
They can be exempted from the visa ban on 
humanitarian grounds, while the assets 
freeze does not apply to funds the target 
requires in order to cover “basic needs.” 
Secondly, trade sanctions, even if lim-
ited, would harm the business interests of 
some European companies. The abundant 
EU arms embargoes concern only the 
defence industry, a largely state-dependent 
sector used to constraints in its exports. The 
European business community would react 
negatively to trade restrictions outside a 
UN mandate. The embargo against Argen-
tina in 1982—the first EU autonomous trade 
measure—affected only the import of Argen-
tinean goods to the EU, not the export of 
European products to the target. Finally, 
there is also a lack of agreement among 
Member States regarding the general use-
fulness of sanctions. Some Member States, 
headed by the United Kingdom and the 
Scandinavian countries, conceive of sanc-
tions as a useful policy tool, while Mediter-
ranean countries have traditionally op-
posed their use. This division is compound-
ed by further disagreements regarding the 
management of the sanctions tool. This 
concerns notably the question of how to 
proceed when a target takes limited steps 
towards compliance with EU aims. While 
some Member States favour the easing of 
sanctions as way of encouraging further 
progress, others prefer to leave sanctions 
in place in order to maintain pressure on 
the target. These diverging attitudes in the 
Council often result in compromise de-
cisions, which send potentially ambiguous 
signals to the target.  
Departure from Half-heartedness?  
In theory, the EU has two alternatives to the 
current state of affairs. It could relinquish 
its autonomous sanctions completely, and 
adopt instead the idea that stigmatising 
countries is pointless and often counter-
productive. Indeed, the EU suffers the direct 
consequences of its own sanctions. Officials 
resent that limiting diplomatic contacts 
with Belarus has hindered co-operation at 
a practical level, such as on border-related 
issues. EU diplomats were unable to even 
meet their Cuban counterparts for several 
months. The EU provided humanitarian aid 
to vulnerable populations in Sudan for a 
decade without investing in the develop-
ment of a viable economy. Even the can-
cellation of summit meetings, such as that 
with Africa, is resented since these provide 
instrumental impulses for co-operation. 
Abandoning the practice of imposing 
sanctions would facilitate co-operation by 
eliminating discord from a number of EU 
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external relationships. In reality, this 
option is impracticable: First, for an EU 
which praises itself for promoting Human 
Rights and democracy, failing to react to 
scandals such as Andijon would be in-
consistent with this self-proclaimed image. 
The European Parliament is also a strong 
advocate of most EU sanctions regimes. 
Secondly, the EU is often compelled to 
impose sanctions by its main international 
partners, primarily the United States. Ever 
since its first autonomous sanctions epi-
sode, the grain embargo against the USSR 
in 1981 in reaction to the Polish crisis, to 
the China arms embargo and then to the 
Transnistrian visa ban, the EU has co-
ordinated sanctions policies with its main 
transatlantic partner. In fact, the EU is “out 
of step” with its Western partners in terms 
of sanctions imposition: Canada and the 
US had withdrawn GSP preferences from 
Belarus a decade before the EU did. The 
US lifted its arms embargo on Indonesia 
some years after the EU lifted its own. And 
needless to say, US restrictions on Burma 
and Cuba are far more forceful than EU 
responses. 
The second alternative would consist in 
designing sanctions with efficacy in mind. 
This option does not imply a return to com-
prehensive sanctions—EU ‘humanitarian-
ism’ would not allow it. Rather, it would 
consist in crafting sanctions not only to 
convey a strong condemnation, but with a 
view to causing sufficient disutility to the 
targets to compel them to change behav-
iour. The advantage of this approach is that 
it would unleash the potential leverage of 
EU sanctions while being consistent with 
humanitarian precepts and the transatlan-
tic dimension of sanctions policy. It would 
require three major steps at different levels. 
First, EU Member States should work 
towards a consensus at the political level 
on the usefulness of targeted sanctions as 
a foreign policy tool, as well as on their 
management. Current sanctions policy 
suffers from excessive ad-hocism. The 
“Basic Principles” represents an embryonic 
exercise which should be expanded to a 
more substantial agreement. The objective 
here is not to draft a programmatic docu-
ment, but rather to build a consensus on 
what is the place of sanctions in EU foreign 
policy, what they are expected to achieve, 
and how their use can be optimised. The EU 
already has some “Guidelines for imple-
mentation” and some “Basic Principles” for 
the use of sanctions in place; it now needs 
a “sanctions strategy.” Secondly, the EU 
should plan for success: Before wielding 
sanctions, it should study thoroughly the 
vulnerability of the target with a view to 
crafting a sanctions package with bite. 
Finally, the pallet of EU sanctions instru-
ments should be strengthened. The EU 
should “resurrect” the use of selective 
economic measures, the sort of sanctions 
wielded during the Kosovo crisis: flight 
bans, partial embargoes and financial bans. 
The efficacy of the measures employed in 
that episode was largely hindered by their 
experimental nature, and ultimately by 
NATO’s military intervention. Yet, their 
results were highly promising and should 
be further explored. In the absence of 
such upgrades, the EU will remain a “self-
restrained” sanctions power with limited 
efficacy. 
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